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Abstract Formal methods for verifying authentication protocols tend to assume
an idealised  perfect form of encryption This approach has been spec
tacularly successful in nding aws  but when we aim for proofs of cor
rectness then we need to consider this assumption more carefully  and
perhaps to weaken it to reect properties of real cryptographic mech
anisms This paper reviews the existing CSP approach to verifying
protocols  and considers how algebraic properties of real cryptographic
mechanisms can be incorporated within a rank function verication
The approach is illustrated with an authentication protocol which makes
use of exclusiveor
  Introduction
Security protocols aim to provide security guarantees between parties
communicating over an insecure network  and possibly in the presence of
malicious agents who can interfere with and disrupt communication traf
c One important security requirement is authentication that agents
have guarantees about the identity of the agent they are communicating
with Other desirable security properties include condentiality  non
repudiation  and anonymity For reasons of space  authentication is the
only property that this paper will focus on
Security protocols  rst proposed in Needham and Schroeder   
make use of cryptography in order to achieve their aims Although ma
licious agents between communicating parties can block  redirect  and
spoof messages  they cannot decrypt messages  or produce encrypted
messages  unless they have the corresponding key  and so this provides
 
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some measure of protection in a hostile environment It is possible to
make use of knowledge of ownership of keys to establish guarantees about
the originators of corresponding messages Authentication protocols
thus describe message exchanges which aim to provide the appropriate
guarantees to the parties involved
However  in practice such protocols are di	cult to design correctly 
because it is extremely di	cult to forsee all the ways potential attack
ers might be able to subvert them This is demonstrated by the fact
that a number of published protocols have since been shown to contain

aws In the past decade  there has been an explosion of activity in
applying formal methods to the analysis of security protocols  from two
directions Firstly  applying modelchecking technology to searching for
attacks see eg Germeau and Leduc   Kemmerer   Kemmerer
et al   Lowe   Lowe   Marrero et al   Meadows 
 Millen   Roscoe   and secondly  in establishing correct
ness with respect to particular properties  and with regard to certain
assumptions about their environment see eg Schneider   Paul
son   Fabrega et al   Abadi and Gordon   Gordon and
Jerey   Such analyses generally assume perfect encryption that
the decryption key must be known in order to extract the encrypted
text  and that a ciphertext can only be generated using encryption with
the appropriate key and message Any real mechanism  such as RSA 
exhibits additional algebraic properties which can introduce new vul
nerabilities  even into protocols whose abstract design is proved secure
Although this has been known for some considerable time see eg Even
et al    more recent formal analysis methods for protocols have
tended to neglect this implementation aspect This means that even
formally veried protocols might have 
awed implementations an ex
ample is given in Ryan and Schneider    where the use of exclusiveor
as an encryption mechanism introduced a 
aw into a previously veried
protocol
This paper reviews the authors use of CSP to model and verify proto
cols  and considers how algebraic properties of real cryptographic mech
anisms can be incorporated within this verication framework The
approach is illustrated with an authentication protocol which makes use
of exclusiveor
 CSP notation
Process algebras provide a particular approach to the study of concur
rency and interaction This paper uses the process algebra CSP Com
municating Sequential Processes A full account of this process algebra
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can be found in Roscoe   or Schneider   It provides a language
for describing interacting systems  together with a semantic theory for
understanding them This section provides a brief reminder of those
aspects most relevant to this paper
The language of CSP is constructed around events instantaneous syn
chronisations which provide the communication primitive Events may
have some structure  the most common being a channel communication
of the form c v   where c is the channel name  and v is the value commu
nicated Channel names and values can themselves have structure For
example  rec A can be a channel passing values of the form j  m The
event corresponding to the transmission of such a message would then
be rec A j  m
Processes are used to describe possible patterns of interaction The
process cv   P describes a process which is prepared to output v on
channel c  and behave subsequently as P  The input cx   Px may
take in some value v along channel c and behave subsequently as Pv
The process STOP is not prepared to perform any events at all  and is
generally used in this paper to denote the end of a process execution
pattern A general choice between a family of processes fP
i
j i  I g
is given as
 
i I
P
i
 Condition statements using if then else  and let
statements  are also possible within the language
Processes may be put in parallel P
k
A
Q behaves as P running con
currently with Q   synchronising on events in A  and performing other
events independently Values are passed between parallel processes by
means of synchronisations on the channels  linking an output channel of
one to an input channel of another An interleaving of two processes 
P jjj Q   simply executes P and Q concurrently  independently of each
other without any communication between them An interleaving of a
family of processes fP
i
j i  I g is written
jjj
i I
P
i
 Each of the P
i
executes independently of and concurrently with all the others
Processes may also be recursively dened  by giving equations which
contain the names of the processes being dened as subterms of the
process expressions For example  a two place buer COPY may be
dened using the following family of equations
COPY  inx   HOLDSx
HOLDSx  iny   out x   HOLDSy
  out x   COPY
The semantics of processes are given in terms of observations A
process is identied with the set of behaviours that may possibly be
observed of it  where the kind of behaviour considered determines the
nature of the model In this paper we are concerned only with the Traces
Model is concerned with the traces of a process the nite sequences
of events that it can perform during some execution For example 
hin  out   in  in  out  i
is a trace of COPY  The set of all traces of a process P is denoted
tracesP
Safety specications are given as predicates on traces  and a process
P satises a specication Str if all of its traces satisfy Str
P sat Str   tr  tracesP  Str
For example  to specify the requirement that some event from the set A
should precede any event from B   we can dene a predicate A precedes B
which means that if some b  B appears in the trace tr then some
a  A must have appeared in the trace previously This can be dened
as follows
b  B  tr  tr

a
hbi
a
tr
 
  a  A a in tr

where
a
is sequence concatenation  and a in tr

means that a appears at
some point within the trace tr

 The authentication properties consid
ered in this paper will be expressed in this way  in terms of the precedes
predicate
 Verifying security protocols with CSP
Security protocols are generally described in terms of the sequence of
messages exchanged by the protocol participants Messages are often
encrypted using either sharedkey or publickey cryptography  and gen
erally include special information such as agent names  secrets shared
between some of the agents  nonces newly generated messages created
specically for a particular protocol run  or newly generated keys to be
distributed between the participants
  Gongs protocol
This paper will consider a protocol proposed in Gong   as an
illustration of the approach The protocol is described in Figure  It
makes use of two oneway functions f and g  We assume that such one
way functions are collisionfree  and that it is computationally infeasible
to extract the value of m from f m or gm The outputs of the one
way functions used in this protocol are treated as triples k  ha hb
The protocol also makes use of the exclusiveor operator  to combine
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  A 	  B AB  na
  B 	  S AB  na nb
  S 	  B ns  f ns  nbAPB k  ha hb  gk  ha hbPB
  B 	  A ns  hb
  A 	  B ha
Figure  Gongs authentication protocol
messages The protocol aims to provide authentication of A to B   and
authentication of B to A It makes use of a trusted server S   with which
each of A and B shares a secret  PA and PB respectively
In message   A generates a nonce na and sends it to B   along
with the two agent names
In message   B generates another nonce nb  and forwards both
na and nb to S along with the two agent names On receipt
of some message   S generates a nonce ns and uses the one
way function f on ns  naB PA to produce f ns  naB PA 
k  ha hb  which is xord with f ns  nbAPB for message 
gk  ha hbPB is also computed to make up message 
On receipt of message   B is able to compute f ns  nbAPB
because it receives ns from the server  and already has nb  A  and
PB No agent or enemy can compute this without PB Thus
it retrieves k  ha hb from the second item  and hence computes
gk  ha hbPB to compare with the third component of message
 If they match then B accepts k as having been freshly generated
by S 
Message  consists of the nonce ns and the value hb On receipt
of this message  A computes f ns  naB PA using the value of
ns received  to obtain k  ha hb  and check whether hb matches
the one received If it does  then A has authenticated B   since
extraction of hb requires the secret PB
Message  consists of A responding with ha On receipt of this
message  B has authenticated A  since extraction of ha requires
the secret PA
The intention is that at the end of the protocol  A and B have each
authenticated the other  and they each have the fresh secret key k 
m  t plaintext
i agent identity
n nonce
k key
Pi shared secret
f oneway function

i
m projection of message i    
m

 m
 
message concatenation
m

m
 
exclusiveor of two messages
Figure  Messages used in Gongs protocol
 CSP description
A CSP description of a protocol such as that given here describes the
behaviour of each agent involved in a protocol run Whereas the original
protocol description of Gong   is given in terms of a correct run of
the protocol  a process algebraic approach in common with many of the
approaches mentioned in the introduction describes the protocol from
the point of view of each of the participants These are described in
terms of the messages that they can send and receive
In order to enable a formal analysis  we rst dene formally the space
of messagesMESSAGE that can be sent and received by protocol agents
This is dened in Figure  In this protocol  we allow agent names 
nonces  keys  shared secrets  as well as concatenating messages  combin
ing them via exclusiveor  applying the oneway functions f and g   and
extracting parts of messages obtained by applying f and g by use of the
projection functions 
i
 Other protocols make use of other kinds of mes
sage component  such as encrypted messages  or timestamps and the
analysis of such protocols will require the inclusion of such components
in the denition of the message space
The protocol is captured within CSP by rst describing a single run for
each role of the protocol We use the channel trans  i to carry messages
m that are transmitted as output to j by an agent i  Occurrence of such
communications will be represented by events of the form trans  i  j  m
Similarly  the channel rec i will carry those messages received as input
to an agent i 
For example  the role played by A in the description of Figure  is that
of the protocol initiator  who starts o a run of the protocol This is done
by sending out a nonce as message   and then waiting for a response
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INIT i  ni 
 
j
trans  i  j  i  j  ni
  rec i  j n m
 
 





trans  i  j  
 
f n ni  j  Pi  STOP
if m  

f n ni  j  Pi
STOP
otherwise
Figure  CSP description of initiating run
SERVERns  rec sj i  j  ni  nj 
  trans  s  j  ns 
f ns  nj  i  Pj  f ns  ni  j  Pi 
gf ns  ni  j  Pi Pj 
  STOP
Figure  CSP description of a run of the server
as message  Finally  the initiator sends out a further conrmation
message Since any agent can play the role of initiator with any nonce 
we dene the general initiator role as a process INIT i  ni parameterised
by the initiating agents name i and initiating nonce ni  The resulting
CSP description is given in Figure  This run begins by choosing some
agent j to communicate with  and then sending the rst message i  j  ni 
It then receives a message with two components n and m  which it can
use to construct f n ni  j  Pi since it is already in possession of ni  
j   and its secret Pi and check that the third component of the result
matches the other input m If it does  then the nal message which is
the second component is transmitted Otherwise we model the run as
simply stopping at that point
A run of the responder role taken by B in the protocol description
and of the trusted server described by S in the protocol description
are described within CSP using the same approach The servers in
volvement in a single run using nonce ns is given as SERVERns in
Figure   and agent j playing the role of the responder with nonce nj is
given as RESPj  nj  in Figure 
RESPj  nj  
rec j ii  j  ni
  trans  j  s  i  j  ni  nj 
  rec j  sn m l
 
 







trans  j  i  n 

m  f n nj  i  Pj 
  rec j  i  
 
m  f n nj  i  Pj   STOP
if l  gm  f n nj  i  Pj  Pj 
STOP
otherwise
Figure  CSP description of a run of the responder
 Protocol analysis
Security protocols are designed to provide certain guarantees in the
face of a hostile environment in which the protocol can be attacked in
particular ways Hence any protocol analysis must include the possibility
of such attacks  in order to establish that they do not happen In this
context  the DolevYao model rst introduced to analyse a particular
class of protocols in Dolev and Yao   has proven a very powerful
abstraction This model allows the hostile environment to be described
in a very general way  in terms of the capabilities of potential attackers or
enemies  rather than in terms of particular attacks which they can carry
out which would not guard against new and currently undiscovered
kinds of attack
In its most general form  the DolevYao model considers the protocol
running in an environment consisting of a single enemy who intercepts all
messages  and is able to send any message that it can generate which
includes those it has intercepted  and messages it can generate from
them to any protocol agent This also enables the enemy to block or
redirect any message The enemy is also able to play the role of a genuine
protocol agent  and thus interact with some other agents on that basis
Thus the enemy has complete control over the communications medium 
and in modelling this in CSP it is equivalent to treat the enemy as the
communications medium that the transmission of a message m from i
to j involves i passing m to the enemy in the hope that the enemy will
then pass m on to j  The model is pictured in Figure 
This extreme model is appropriate only for safety properties  since
the enemy could simply block all communication and hence subvert any
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ENEMY
AGENT
A
AGENT
B
AGENT
C
SERVER
trans  A
rec A
Figure  The CSP architecture of the DolevYao model
liveness requirement However  many security properties  including au
thentication  are indeed safety properties  and hence can be veried using
this model
The enemy is constrained by cryptography For example  it is unable
to encrypt or decrypt messages if it does not have the appropriate key
In this paper  the enemy is unable to extract either m

or m
 
if it has
only the message m

m
 

The enemys ability to deduce or generate new messages from those
it already knows about is captured by a generates relation 
  which
denes the precise ways in which the enemy can create messages The
relation S 
 m states that the message m can be generated from the
set of messages S  There are three general closure conditions for the
relation
fmgs 
 m for any m
If S
 

 m and S
 
 S

then S


 m
If S 
 m

for every m

 T   and T 
 m  then S 
 m
The relation 
 is then dened to be the smallest relation closed under
these three conditions  and such that
fm

m
 
g 
 m

 m
 

fm

 m
 
g 
 m


fm

 m
 
g 
 m
 

ff mg 
 f m
fmg 
 
i
m
 	
fm

m
 
g 
 m

m
 

fm

m

m
 
g 
 m
 

fm
 
m

m
 
g 
 m


Thus messages can be concatenated and deconcatenated they can be
transformed under oneway functions they can be projected and they
can be exclusiveord and extracted from exclusiveor messages The
enemy can generate messages only using these rules Observe that there
is no rule for obtaining m from f m  re
ecting the dening property of
oneway functions
Even before any protocol runs occur  the enemy knows some messages
the names of the agents  the oneway functions  its own secret shared
with the server since the enemy is also able to take the role of a protocol
agent  and the ability to generate some nonces We will take the set
IK to represent the set of messages that the enemy knows initially The
enemy is also able to add to the store of messages that it knows by
observing messages being sent along the trans channel by other agents
At any stage it could also send any message along rec that it can
generate to any protocol agent though of course agents might not be
expecting such messages and could simply ignore or reject them Such
an enemy can be described as the following recursive process  where S
is the set of messages the enemy currently has
ENEMY  ENEMY IK 
ENEMY S  transij m   ENEMY S  fmg
 
 
fmjSmg
 
i j
rec i  j  m  ENEMY S
The system we analyse consists of the individual agents communicat
ing with the enemy In general  any individual agent might be able to
perform a number of concurrent runs of the protocol  taking either ini
tiator or responder role in each case This is described as an interleaved
combination of INIT and RESP runs
AGENT
i
 
jjj
ni IN
i
INIT i  ni jjj 
jjj
ni NR
i
RESPi  ni
where NI
i
is the innite set of nonces i uses in initiator runs and NR
i
is the innite set of nonces i uses in responder runs These sets do
not overlap  and they are disjoint with the sets of nonces used by other
agents
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A B S
init done A B
resp running  B  A
Figure  Signals for an authentication requirement A authenticates B
The server is described in a similar fashion  using its own set of nonces
NS   able to handle any number of runs at the same time
SERVER 
jjj
ns NS
SERVERns
Finally  the entire system is described as all the protocol agents in
parallel with the enemy
SYSTEM  SERVER jjj 
jjj
i
AGENT
i

k
ftrans recg
ENEMY IK 
 Security properties
The aim of authentication is to obtain some assurance about the iden
tity of the other party involved in the protocol Considered in terms of
the messages that are sent and received within a protocol run  an au
thentication property will use messages received by one party to provide
certain guarantees about messages that must have been transmitted by
the other party In its simplest form  it can require that receipt by A
of a particular message apparently from B to A is only possible if B did
indeed send that message to A In Gongs protocol  for example  receipt
by A of message  apparently from B might provide a guarantee that
B indeed transmitted that message  even in the presence of the enemy
However  the values ns and hb must be validated by A and not simply
received for authentication to occur Thus to express the authentication
requirements more explicitly  it is useful to introduce additional signal
messages into the CSP descriptions of the protocol agents  which indi
cate various points that they are along their execution runs Thus we
 
will introduce an additional event resp running  i  j into the description
of the responder run  before message   which indicates that the respon
der i has reached a point where it can claim to be running the protocol
with responder j  We also introduce an event init done i  j into the ini
tiator run after the information received in message  has been checked
successfully The protocol with these additional messages is pictured
in Figure  This authentication property is captured as a property on
SYSTEM  that any occurrence of init done A B must be preceded by
the occurrence of resp running  B  A Formally this is written as
SYSTEM sat resp running  B  A precedes init done A B
In fact there is a whole range of authentication properties that can be
expressed in this kind of way The information associated with the signal
events can be changed to re
ect the required level of matching between
the two protocol runs For example
resp running  B precedes init done A B indicates that A has au
thenticated the fact that B has been running the protocol  and
hence that B is active but not that B considers A to be the other
party
resp running  B  A k precedes init done A B  k states that A au
thenticates B   and that they agree on the value of the key k deliv
ered in the protocol run
the number of occurrences of init done A B should be no greater
than the number of occurrences of resp running  B  A states that
each authentication of B by A should correspond to a dierent
protocol run by B   thus avoiding multiple authentications of the
same responder run
A hierarchy of CSP authentication properties is discussed in greater
detail in Lowe  
 Rank functions for verication
The main result of Schneider   is a theorem providing circum
stances in which it can be proven that SYSTEM sat R precedes T   where
R and T are both sets of events This enables authentication properties
written in this form to be established for authentication protocols For
example  authentication of B to A in the protocol above corresponds to
the requirement fresp running  B  Ag precedes finit done A Bg
The theorem makes use of a rank function  which maps messages
to some domain of values This domain was the integers in Schneider 
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  and was simplied to the set f g in Heather   and Heather
and Schneider   In fact  any set RANK will do  so we will present
the theorem here in a generalised form  with respect to an arbitrary set
of rank values RANK 
Theorem   If the set RANK is partitioned into sets RANK

and
RANK

  and for sets of events R and T  there is a rank function
 MESSAGE   RANK satisfying
 m  IK  m  RANK

 S  MESSAGE m  MESSAGE 
m

 S  m

  RANK

  S 
 m m  RANK

  t  T  t  RANK

 J  USER
j
k
R
STOP sat preservesRANK

then SYSTEM sat R precedes T
The theorem reduces a requirement on the overall system to separate re
quirements on the individual components of the system The conditions
correspond to the following requirements
 the enemy starts o only with messages with ranks in RANK


 the enemy can only generate messages with ranks in RANK

un
less it already has some message with rank not in RANK


 no event in T has rank in RANK


 for every user when blocked on events from R if it only ever
inputs messages with ranks in RANK

  it will only output mes
sages with ranks in RANK

 This is formalised in the predicate
preservesRANK

on traces
Conditions     and  together ensure that only messages with rank
within RANK

can ever be passed in the system blocked on R Condi
tion  allows the conclusion that no event from T can therefore occur
Hence the problem of verifying a protocol against a certain authenti
cation property reduces to the problem of nding a rank function which
meets all these conditions This has been done for Gongs protocol see
Evans and Schneider  a  and Figure  provides such a rank func
tion That rank function appears after the next section because it has
been constructed to take into account the considerations of the next
section  concerning the algebraic properties of exclusiveor
 
 Weakening the perfect encryption assumption
Most formal protocol analysis to date has incorporated the perfect
encryption assumptions discussed in Pereira and Quisquater  
that
 the decryption key must be known in order to extract the plaintext
corresponding to a given ciphertext
 there is enough redundancy in the crypto system that a ciphertext
can only be generated using encryption with the appropriate key
and message
These assumptions have been required for tractability of the analysis 
and protocols shown to be 
awed even under these powerful assumptions
will remain 
awed in implementation The way we have modelled the
enemy using the 
 relation above incorporates the perfect encryption
assumption  since that assumption is encapsulated by those rules  and
the enemy can generate and obtain messages only by using these rules
However  although they are a powerful abstraction  the assumptions
are obviously not true in practice Common encryption mechanisms
which violate them include
RSA Rivest et al    whose multiplicative structure means
that fm

g
k
fm
 
g
k
 fm

 m
 
g
k
of course  multiplication of mes
sages is a dierent kind of operation not mentioned in the denition
of messages Also  RSA encryption is commutative ffmg
k
 
g
k


ffmg
k

g
k
 
Vernam encryption exclusiveor of a key and a text to produce
the ciphertext Exclusiveor has many algebraic properties which
might be exploited to attack a protocol For example  possession
of m and fmg
k
allow the extraction of k   which is not normal for
encryption systems
In order to allow verication of protocol implementations which make
use of particular cryptographic mechanisms  the properties of the mech
anisms should be incorporated into the analysis
One way of doing this is by extending the 
 relation to allow addi
tional clauses  corresponding to further ways in which messages can be
generated For example  to capture the rst property of RSA above  we
would add the following clause
ffm

g
k
 fm
 
g
k
g 
 fm

 m
 
g
k
The rank function Theorem  remains applicable  and the only change
is that the set RANK

must be preserved even under these additional
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clauses In other words  clause  needs to be checked under these
additional conditions
However  if there are algebraic identities introduced by the imple
mentation of encryption  then it is more appropriate to introduce such
equations onto the message space The rank function theorem again
remains applicable  but some additional checking is required on rank
function denitions  since rank functions tend in practice to be dened
inductively over the message space It will be necessary to ensure that
any such rank function is welldened that dierent constructions of
the same message do not give rise to dierent rank values
In the case of Vernam encryption  a message m is encrypted with a
key k by taking the exclusiveor  of m and k  m  k  We will assume
that the arguments to an exclusiveor are the same length
fmg
k
 m  k
The set of messages of length n under  forms an abelian group in which
every element is its own inverse The identity of this group will be the
sequence of n s The identities of  were not mentioned explicitly in
the space of messages  but we will treat them as plaintext  covered by
the clause t 
Furthermore   interacts with concatenation as follows if m

and m


have the same length  and m
 
and m

 
have the same length  then
m

 m
 
 m


 m

 
  m

m


 m
 
m

 
 
Unfortunately  this equation is not compatible with the original anal
ysis of the Gong protocol given in Evans and Schneider  a which
was not concerned with this identity In that paper  the rank function
included the denitions
m

 m
 
  minm

 m
 

m

m
 
 

 if m

  m
 

 otherwise

The rst clause is completely standard in rank function analysis it
captures the fact that if either m

or m
 
cannot circulate in the system 
then neither can m

 m
 
 The second clause allows m

m
 
to circulate
even if m

and m
 
are both secret This is necessary to re
ect the fact
that encrypted messages are sent over the network
However  this rank function is not welldened in the presence of
Equation  If m

  m

 
   and m


  m
 
    then by
applying the denitions we nd that
m

 m
 
 m


 m

 
  
m

m


 m
 
m

 
  
 
Yet these are two constructions of the same message  and so the rank
function should give the same result for each construction
A closer inspection reveals that although m

 m
 
should have rank 
because of m
 
  and m


 m

 
should have rank  because of m


  the ranks
of the components of the messages do not match and hence should have
rank  when xord together
On the other hand  the dierent message m

 m
 
m

 
 m


should have
rank   since the ranks match for each component of the two messages
Thus in the presence of Equation  it is necessary to maintain a rank
value for each component in a concatenated message  and not simply one
value overall Hence it is most straightforward to use a nite sequence
of values of  or  as a rank value The set RANK

will be those
sequences consisting entirely of s
RANK  f g

RANK

 fg

RANK

 RANK 	 RANK

For reasons of space  we consider only authentication of responder B by
initiator A  for two arbitrary users A and B   with A making use of a
nonce N
A

Authentication of B to A is achieved by INIT A receiving the fourth
message n m of the protocol As illustrated in Figure  earlier  this
is made explicit by the introduction of the signal event init done A B
event  which signals the point at which A is deemed to have success
fully authenticated B  This event can occur only if m  hb  where
f n ni  j  Pi  k  ha hb Authentication can be shown by analysing
the system resulting from all occurrences of resp running  A B being
blocked if it is impossible for A to perform that event in the resulting
restricted system  then we have shown that A can only perform its signal
event if B has previously performed its own
Previous results see Ryan et al   and Heather and Schneider 
 mean that we need only provide a rank function which is preserved
by INIT AN
A
  by any server run SERVERN
S
  and by any responder
run RESPB N
B
 in which resp running  A B  N
A
is blocked  as shown
in Figure 
The use of sequences of values for RANK allows an appropriate rank
function to be constructed in a straightforward fashion Figure  gives
such a function  which meets all of the conditions of Theorem  and
is welldened in the presence of the additional algebraic properties of
exclusiveor discussed above Rather than make use of the projection
functions explicitly within the denition of messages  we are now taking
account of various equations on messages Thus we can make explicit
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RESPB N
B
 
rec Bii  B  ni
  trans  B  s  i  B  ni  N
B

  rec B  s  n m l
 
 












resp running  i  B if i  A
  letk  hc hd  m  f n N
B
 i  PB in
 


trans  B  i  n hd 
rec B  i  hc  STOP if l  gk  hc hd  PB
STOP otherwise
STOP if i  A
Figure 	 Responder with resp running A B blocked
that the result of applying the function f is a message of the form k  h

 h
 
 
where h has now been introduced as a new kind of message representing
the second and third components of the range of f  We also require
that any h appears in the image of no more than one message  so f m
and f m

 have no subelds in common if m and m

are dierent This
requirement is stronger than collisionfreeness on f   and was identied
as necessary within the analysis in Evans and Schneider  a
The algebraic equivalences are built into the denition of the rank
function  in the clauses of the rank function which consider whether the
message is equal to some particular message ie the clauses for h and
for f m
The rank of m

 m
 
is obtained by combining the ranks of m

and
m
 
  applying the function from Line  pointwise
The lengths of messages is an issue that has been mentioned but
skirted in this paper Here we are assuming that all atomic messages
have the same unit length  and that  only combines messages of the
same length A more complete treatment would incorporate a more
explicit notion of length into the message notation  perhaps describing
a message as a pair m n where n gives its length
 Discussion
In this paper we have reviewed the rank function approach to verifying
authentication protocols We have considered the impact of introducing
equations re
ecting algebraic properties of concrete cryptomechanisms 
 
t  hi
i  hi
n  hi
k  hi
f   hi
Pi 
 


hi if i  A or i  B
hi otherwise
h 
 












hi if  n

 n
 
 k  h

 
f n

 n
 
 A PB  k  h h

 f n

 n
 
 A PB  k  h

 h
 f n

 n
 
 B  PA  k  h h

 f n

 n
 
 B  PA  k  h

 h
hi otherwise
m

 m
 
  m


a
m
 

m

m
 
  m

 m
 

f m 
 


h  i if  n

 n
 
 m  n

 n
 
 A PB
h  i if  n

 n
 
 m  n

 n
 
 B  PA
h  i otherwise
where
m n 

 if m  n
 otherwise
ms

a
ms
 
 ns

a
ns
 
  ms

 ns


a
ms
 
 ns
 

Figure 
 Rank function   MESSAGE   seqf 	g

with particular reference to an example making use of exclusiveor The
central theorem remains applicable in this case  but the denition of the
rank function  generally given inductively over the space of messages 
must be more carefully considered to ensure that it is welldened in
the presence of the additional equations In this case we found it more
appropriate to provide a more elaborate space of rank values to re
ect
this need The paper contains an initial investigation into the impact of
equations on the message space More protocol examples  with equations
for dierent mechanisms  will need to be carried out in order to obtain
any general picture of the practical impact on this approach to protocol
verication
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Much previous work by this author and others on protocol analysis
relies on the perfect encryption assumption The impact of introducing
equations into the various approaches is not clear and is an area of
current research For example  there are results that allow an analysis
to assume that all messages are welltyped see Heather et al   It
is not clear that these results always remain applicable when equations
are introduced Obtaining conditions when these results are applicable
is a current area of research activity
Mechanised assistance for the rank function approach to protocol ver
ication has also been developed A general theory for CSP has been
provided in the theoremprover PVS Owre et al    together with
a security protocolspecic theory on top of that  given in Dutertre and
Schneider    Bryans and Schneider    and Evans and Schneider 
b It seems likely that generalising the results to use an arbitrary
set RANK as introduced in this paper would be straightforward
With regard to the introduction of equations  some aspects of the
algebra of exclusiveor were already incorporated into the PVS analy
sis reported in Evans and Schneider  a However  it is not yet clear
whether in the most general case additional proof obligations concerning
welldenedness of rank functions could be introduced within the exist
ing framework Abstract datatypes in PVS are freely generated  giving
rise to useful axioms enabling inductive reasoning The introduction of
algebraic identities undermines these results  for example by requiring
functions to be dened on the message space rather than as constructors
of the message datatype This will make reasoning more messy and less
automated
There are also circumstances in which rank functions to verify pro
tocols can be generated automatically where they exist  as detailed in
Heather   This is possible because of the result that in an auto
mated construction of a rank function we only need to consider messages
which are submessages of real protocol messages In the presence of
equations the notion of submessage is less clear  and we are currently
investigating conditions on equations for which the approach remains
valid
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